Price bargaining is a common feature of American bargaining when supply is uncontrolled. The lack agriculture, thanks to federal legislation that pro-of supply control is important because it is a salient tects agricultural producers, including fishermen, feature of agricultural bargaining structure, to wit from antitrust exposure (Frederick) . Yet the schol-(French, p. 17): arly literature is virtually devoid of studies that elucidate the economic effects of agricultural price Farmer bargaining associations are voluntary bargaining in any systematic fashion. Early work cooperatives organized to give individual farmby Helmberger and Hoos remains the theoretical ers a greater voice and (hopefully) more power foundation for the few existing studies on agriculin dealing with what, for most commodities, is a tural price bargaining (e.g., see French and the relatively small number of processor buyers. references cited therein). The Helmberger and These associations are a type of cartel that conHoos' model, however, treats buyers of agricultrols the disposition of the members' product but tural products as a colluding monopsony, which that has no control over the quantity produced. may overstate the market power enjoyed by midIndividual farmer members behave approxidlemen. Ladd extends Helmberger and Hoos's mately as perfect competitors in production, analysis, but does not address the long-run effects i.e., they generally do not take account of the of price bargaining, the major focus of this paper.
possible effect of their own output on price reDiscussing noncooperative game theory, Sexton ceived [italics added]. identifies a number of principles (e.g., first-mover advantage and the importance of patience and out-This lack of supply control is beneficial in that it side options) that appear to apply to agricultural limits the bargaining associations' ability to exerbargaining situations, but assumes that the quantity cise undue market power.' But it raises questions sold is independent of the bargaining outcome.
about the long-term effectiveness of agricultural The objective of this research is to determine the bargaining associations in that any price increases price and quantity impacts of agricultural price obtained by the cartel could easily be dissipated by the ensuing production responses, especially if demand at the farm level is price inelastic. The problem of supply response is exacerbated if price bar-
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ers have limited production for the purposes of price enhancement.
appears likely given the substitutability between supplied of the farm product by cartel members, cartel and non-cartel output.
Qs is the quantity supplied of the farm product This paper explores these issues by developing a by non-cartel members, Pw is the wholesale price model that describes the price and quantity impacts of the processed product, Pf is the farm product's of price bargaining in a market-equilibrium set-market price, and PB is the floor price negotiated ting. An advantage of the model is that it side-steps (or announced) by the cartel, which is assumed to the well-known indeterminacy of the bilateral bar-reflect the supply-inducing price for cartel memgaining solution (Henderson and Quandt, ), yet yields testable hypotheses about the role of In this model, PB is assumed to be exogenous. market supply and demand elasticities and free All inventories (live and processed) are assumed to riding on cartel effectiveness. 2 be "pipeline" stocks, so changes in inventories The model's usefulness is demonstrated by an associated with changes in the floor price are negapplication to price-bargaining in the catfish indus-ligible. Arbitrage between cartel and non-cartel try. The catfish industry is an insightful case study producers is disallowed. That is, I assume that inbecause it represents features common to other ag-stitutional or practical barriers exist to prevent carricultural bargaining situations (e.g., voluntary tel members from obtaining non-cartel output for membership in the bargaining association, lack of resale at the floor price. N and E are demand and supply control, atomistic competition among farm-supply elasticities, respectively, and T is the ers, and small number of processor buyers, see wholesale-farm price-transmission elasticity.
3 L is Iskow and Sexton) and data are available to test a structural elasticity that indicates the percent hypotheses about cartel effectiveness.
change in the farm price associated with a one I begin by discussing the model. Hypotheses percent change in the floor price, assuming supply generated from the model are then tested via joint is fixed. L henceforth will be called the "bargainestimation of price-transmission and demand equa-ing elasticity." kB and kNB indicate the proportion tions. A key insight from the analysis is that free of total production that is represented by cartel and riders, i.e., producers who choose not to partici-non-cartel members, respectively. Given the negpate in the cartel but benefit from any spillover ative sign in equation (1), N, E, T, and L are aseffects of the cartel price onto the market price, sumed to be positive. However, because cartel parmay actually assist the cartel by attenuating supply ticipation is voluntary, L is assumed to be less than response, the Achilles' heel of collective bargain-one and will be zero if the cartel is ineffectual. ing schemes.
The price-linkage equation (equation (2)) is a quasi-reduced form that describes the behavior of Model the marketing group, i.e., processors and the bargaining association (Hildreth and Jarrett). That the Consider the following Muth-type equilibrium-equation accurately depicts the relationship beequation accurately depicts the relationship be-~d isplacement model ^tween the wholesale price and the farm price rests on the assumption that forces that cause the two (1) dln Qd = -N dln P, (wholesale-level prices to change (e.g., shifts in retail demand or _,demand) farm supply) exert their influences separately (2) dln Pf = T dln P, (wholesalerather than in combination (Gardner, p. 404 where Qd is the quantity demanded of the pro-not necessarily have to be positive, as earlier assumed. In particular, if cessed product at wholesale, Q 5 B is the quantity observed changes in the farm-wholesale price spread are due strictly to shifts in the supply schedule for marketing inputs, and if the substitution elasticity between marketing inputs (e.g., plant labor) and the farmbased input (e.g., live catfish) is less than the absolute value of the 2 do not wish to trivialize the indeterminacy problem. As Sexton wholesale-level demand elasticity, then T in equation (2) is negative ably argues, bilateral-bargaining theory provides useful insights, despite (Gardner, p. 404, fn. 10) . In the more usual case in which observed the multiplicity of equilibria. It is just that from a longer-run perspective, margin changes are driven chiefly by shifts in farm supply or retail I believe that market power is less germane than supply response.
demand, the elasticity is expected to be positive.
this is not the case, a more complicated form of the wholesale price is obtained by substituting equaprice-transmission equation may need to be spec-tion (6) into (2), which yields ified (Wohlgenant and Mullen) . The market-clearing mechanism in the model
E (kB + kNB L)I
(N + k~N E T)} dln Ps. may be thought of as representing a mixture of N N goal-and nongoal-equilibrium processes (Chiang, Equation (7) indicates that an increase in the floor pp. 35-36). That is, in the closed portion of the price always decreases the wholesale price for normarket, an ex post goal equilibrium is achieved mal sloping supply and demand curves. However, that represents the final outcome of the bargaining if total supply is fixed, as would be true in the or "price-signaling" process. (Because negotiated "short run" (e.g., within one year following the or announced prices are "sticky" (typically fixed increase in the cartel price for many commodities) for three months or longer), and reflect nonmarket equation (7) indicates that the wholesale price is factors (e.g., negotiating skill), it is reasonable to unaffected by the floor price. Thus, from the proassume that producers regard these prices as exog-cessor perspective, the bargaining association repenous.) In the open portion of the market, a non-resents an unambiguous threat to profit margins, goal equilibrium is achieved that reflects the out-unless supply is fixed. come of two opposing forces: processors competThe effect of an increase in the floor price on ing in the open (non-cartel) market for the industry output is obtained by substituting equation available (lower-cost) supply, and "seepage" (7) into (1), which yields from the closed market due to the extra supply stimulated by the higher cartel price. Depending N (B kNB L) upon the relative strengths of the opposing forces,
(N + kN E T)} din P the equilibrium farm price consistent with equation Equation (8) indicates that so long as supply or (5) may be higher or lower than the price obtained demand is not perfectly inelastic, an increase in the in a pure nongoal (market) equilibrium, floor price always increases industry output. The The effect of a change in the floor price on the magnitude of the output response depends in part equilibrium farm price can be determined by sub-on the level of cartel participation. For example, if stituting equations (1)- (4) into equation (5) and participation is complete (kB = 1.0), the reducedsolving for dln Pf, which yields form coefficient in equation (8) reduces to the supply elasticity E, which in general is greater than
theory predicts that the bargaining association, if successful, will enlarge industry output. The term in braces in equation (6) is the reducedform coefficient for dln PB: it measures the effect of an increase in the floor price on farm price after Free Riding taking into account supply response and middlemen reactions to the floor price. This effect may be Returning to equation (6) and setting = [L Npositive, zero or negative depending on the relative (1 kNB) E T]/(N + kNB E T), the effect of free magnitudes of the two terms in the numerator of riding on the ability of the bargaining association (6). In particular, for an increase in the floor price to enhance farm price can be determined by taking to increase the farm price, it must be the case that the partial derivative of [ with respect to kNB, L N > kB E T.
which yields: If supply is fixed (E = 0), the reduced-form coefficient in equation (6) reduces to the structural (9) al/akNB = E parameter L. Thus, theory predicts that if supply is + E T 2 ]/(N + kNB E T). fixed, an increase in the floor price always in-Equation (9) indicates the effect of an increase in creases the farm price, assuming the floor price is free riding (reduced cartel participation) on the effective, i.e., L # 0. If supply is not fixed, the ability of the cartel to raise farm price. The sign of relationship between the floor price and the farm equation (9) depends on the magnitude of the barprice is indeterminate without information about the relative magnitudes of the supply and demand elasticities, the bargaining elasticity, the transmis-gaining elasticity L and will always be positive for and to demonstrate the model's usefulness, I use L < 1. Because L in general is expected to be data for the Catfish Bargaining Association between zero and one, equation (9) yields the hy-(CBA), which was formed in 1989 in an effort to pothesis that increases in free riding increases the raise the price received by catfish producers. cartel's price-enhancement ability. The economic
The CBA operates in a manner similar to that rational for this somewhat surprising result inheres described by French. The membership decides on in the uncontrolled nature of supply response: as a price it thinks the market will bear given anticicartel membership increases (free-riding de-pated market conditions and the estimated total creases) the proportion of producers responding to supply of fish for the contract period. Prior to July the higher cartel price increases, which under-1, 1991, The Catfish Institute-the producers' barmines the cartel's price-enhancement ability.
gaining representative-negotiated with procesNote that the foregoing results pertain to a given sors to secure the desired floor price (Allen) . Once value ofL. To the extent that L is itself influenced an agreement was reached, the negotiated price by free riding; for example, by diminishing the floor was announced, which all CBA members and cartel's influence at the bargaining table, free affected processors were expected to honor. Startriding can still damage the cartel's overall effec-ing July 1, 1991, the CBA abandoned face-to-face tiveness. The important point, however, is that if negotiations with processors in favor of voluntary the cartel does not take steps to control supply adherence to a "recommended minimum price" response, free riders to some extent serve this established by association members. 6 The CBA function defacto, and thereby enhance the cartel's makes no attempt to limit production or to assign effectiveness, ceteris paribus.
marketing quotas. Because of escape clauses in the The relationship L N > kB E T from equation (6) original contracts (e.g., association members with can be used to define a minimum-effective bargain-pre-existing production contracts could sell for less ing elasticity, i.e., the minimum numerical value than the floor price and no minimum-purchase rethat L must obtain if the bargaining association is quirements were imposed on processors), complito secure price enhancement in the face of supply ance with the negotiated floor prices was essenresponse. The minimum-effective bargaining elas-tially voluntary, as is the case for the recomticity is L m = kB E T / N. That the minimum-mended minimum price. effective bargaining elasticity increases, ceteris
The relationship between CBA's voluntary floor paribus, with increases in cartel participation un-prices and the market price is estimated jointly derscores the dual nature of cartel membership: a with wholesale demand via the equations (time high level of participation strengthens the cartel's subscripts suppressed): hand at the negotiating table (which is manifested by an increase in the ex ante value of L), but it (10) In Pf = ao + al In Pw + a 2 In W undermines the cartel by accentuating supply re-+ a 3 In PB + a 4 In Pf-1 + u sponse, which raises the minimum value that L must achieve to render the cartel effective.
(11) In Q = bo + bl In Pw + b 2 In M The foregoing model is consistent with the view + b 3 In A + b 4 In Qthat price bargaining acts as a corrective for infor-+ b TR+ .i=13 ci Si + mation-based deficiencies in the market mechanism (Breimyer, . In particular, the where Pf is the pond-bank price of live catfish; Pw signaling aspect of price bargaining may hasten is the average wholesale price of processed fish; W price discovery, which is akin to a technical is the minimum-wage rate (line workers in catfish change that shifts the supply schedule for market-processing plants tend to be paid at or slightly ing inputs down. A downward shift in the market-above the minimum wage); PB is the announced ing-inputs' supply schedule in general will cause floor price in force during period t; 7 Q is the total the farm price to rise and/or the wholesale price to quantity of catfish sold by U.S. processing plants; fall (e.g., see Kinnucan and Nelson) . The model is M is the total U.S. imports of processed catfish; A also consistent with Bunje's assertion (p. 37) that "... bargaining cannot overcome the law of supply and demand." 6 According to Allen, the switch from formal contracts to "jaw boning" occurred in response to large supplies of fish that had accumulated following the original series of contracts, a telling point.
Application
7 The announced floor price is defined to be greater than or equal to the market price. So prior to November 1989 and for several months in A key parameter in the analytical model is the 1991 and 1993 when the floor price was permitted to "float" or the bA rKgaey pamelterinth aticat t elastt market price moved above the negotiated price, the floor price was set bargaining elasticity. To estimate this elasticity, equal to the farm price.
is total industry expenditures on advertising; TR is variable. The logarithmic specification was selected because recent analysis by Nyankori suggests this form fits the data better than the linear intervention (1986.3-89.10) and four years of inform. The farm price is specified as the dependent tervention (1989.11-93.12 ).9 The first two observariable to permit a direct test of whether the struc-vations are lost due to the presence of the lagged tural elasticity defining the relationship between dependent variable in the empirical model and the the announced floor price and the market price is estimation procedure to be discussed later. indeed nonzero. The price and quantity data for catfish were obEquation (11) is similar to the wholesale de-taied from Tables 11, 12, 14 and 17 of USDA's mand equation estimated by Zidack, Kinnucan and Aquaculture Situation and Outlook Report. Data Hatch except that income is omitted from the for the CPI and the minimum wages rates were model and advertising is expressed as contempo-obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United raneous rather than lagged four months. Income is States and the Bureau of Labor Statistics Detailed omitted because Zidack, Kinnucan, and Hatch CPI Report. The advertising data were obtained CPI Report. The advertising data were obtained found it to be insignificant. Advertising is ex-from the advertising agency handling the account pressed without a lag under the hypothesis that for The Catfish Institute, the industry marketing consumer delay in responding to changes in adver-organization responsible for advertising and protising expenditures is less likely now that the ad-ducer price negotiations over the sample period. vertising program has been in force for seven years These data are actual, not budgeted, expenditures (since April 1987).8 Following Zidack, Kinnucan for catfish ads in all media, chiefly magazines and and Hatch a marketing cost variable is excluded radio from equation (11), which is a derived-demand
The data on the announced floor price were obequation, because previous analysis indicated it tained from various issues of The Catfish Journal, was non-significant. which reported the negotiated or "recommended That an increase in the negotiated (or an-minimum" price and its effective duration. The nounced) floor price causes an increase in the farm announced floor price and the market price of catprice is tested by forming the hypothesis: fish at the time in which the announced price was (12a) HN: a 3 = 0 to go into effect are reported in Table 1 . Since its
HA: a 3 > 0 inception, the CBA on average has negotiated a price that was 3.1 cents per pound higher than the Hypothesis (12) represents a one-tail test that can contemporaneous market price, a 4.6% nominal be tested with a standard t-statistic.
increase over the average market price for the 1989-93 period.
Data and Estimation Procedure
Owing to zero observations for advertising, one dollar was added to each monthly observation The model was estimated with 94 monthly obser-(zero and non-zero values alike) after deflation to vations covering about four years of CBA non-permit taking logarithms. Because the average un- quantity, thus equations (10) and (11) the model as a system using 3SLS. The instru-In W -0 0077 (-015) ments included the predetermined variables in in P -0. 595 (10.16) equations (10) and (11) 
Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios. The hypothesis of first-order serial correlation bAutocorrelation coefficient prior to adjustment for serial corcould be rejected for the demand equation, but not relation. The price transmission equation was corrected for sefor the price-transmission equation. Thus, the rial correlation using Hatanaka's two-step procedure.
price-transmission equation was corrected for serial correlation using Hatanaka's two-step procedure in LIMDEP (Greene, . which suggests that catfish demand is subject to Unless stated otherwise, hypothesis testing is seasonal shifts and is highest in the first calendar based on a t-test at the 5% probability level. quarter (Lenten period). Trend is positive and significant, which suggests that catfish is still in the growth phase of the product life cycle (e.g., see
Estimation Results
Zidack, Kinnucan and Hatch). Turning to the price-transmission equation, the Estimation results in general are satisfactory (Ta-estimated (long-run) wholesale-farm price transble 2). The R 2 's of 0.95 and 0.98 suggest the equa-mission elasticity is 0.41. This suggests that the tions provide a good fit to the data. Most of the farm price is relatively insensitive to changes in the estimated coefficients have the expected sign and wholesale price, which may reflect processor marare significant. The lagged dependent variables in ket power (e.g., Kinnucan and Sullivan). The laboth equations are significant at the 1% level or bor cost variable is not significant, contrary to exlower and the estimated coefficients lie between pectations. zero and one, as required to satisfy stability conThe key policy variable, the announced floor ditions.
price, is positive and highly significant (t-ratio of The estimated long-run demand elasticity, 10). The estimated short-and long-run elasticities which is obtained by dividing the wholesale-price are, respectively, 0.60 and 0.80. These elasticities coefficient by one minus the coefficient of the imply that if the announced floor price increases lagged dependent variable, is -0.32. Zidack, 1%, and supply is fixed, the farm price can be Kinnucan, and Hatch's estimate was -1.01 based expected to increase 0.6% immediately and 0.8% on 1980-89 data and Kinnucan et al.'s estimate after sufficient time has elapsed for the farm price was -1.54 based on 1980-83 data. The smaller to adjust fully to a change in the announced floor elasticities in the more recent periods indicate that price. Thus, the hypothesis that the CBA has had a catfish demand is becoming less elastic over time. favorable impact on the market price of live catfish
The estimated long-run advertising elasticity of is supported by the data. 0.0066 is close to Zidack, Kinnucan, and Hatch's Recall from the earlier discussion that the conestimate of 0.0075. The insignificance of the im-dition L N > kB E T must obtain if an increase in ports variable may reflect the declining importance the floor price is to increase the farm price when of imports as a supply source in U.S. markets. (In supply response is permitted. Substituting the emrecent years, catfish imports have declined to less pirical estimates of L = 0.80, T = 0.41, and N = than 2% of processor sales.)
.32 into this expression, and setting the producer The seasonal dummy variables are significant, sign-up parameter kB equal to 0.80 (an estimate of the upper bound of participation over the 1989-93 price augmentation, 2.82%, occurs when supply is period) yields the inequality E < 0.78. This means relatively unresponsive to price (E = 0.15) and that the supply elasticity for catfish must be less CBA participation is relatively low (kB = 0.50). than 0.78 for the CBA to be effective at raising the When supply is relatively elastic (E = 0.58) and farm price without overt supply control. If pro-participation is high (kB = 0.80), the increase in ducer participation drops to 50%, the minimum-farm price is reduced to 0.78%. Overall, it appears effective supply elasticity increases to 1.25. These that compared to the supply elasticity, results are results, which quantify the relationship between relatively insensitive to CBA participation. Thus, free riding and supply response discussed earlier, for the parameter values indicated in Table 3 , carsuggest that catfish supply may be relatively price tel participation has a minor effect on rent dissipainelastic for the CBA to extract sustained benefits tion (to be discussed later). for producers. Simulated CBA impacts on the wholesale price range from -1.69% to -6.66% and are largest when producer participation is high and supply is Simulation relatively elastic. Moreover, these price impacts in every case exceed the quantity impacts, which inAn estimate of the actual CBA-based benefits to dicates that the announced price floor causes a reproducers-and the corresponding costs to proces-duction in processor revenues. That is, the estisors-can be determined by simulating equations mated CBA-induced increases in quantity, which (6)-(8) utilizing elasticity estimates obtained from range from 0.54% to 2.13%, are not sufficiently the econometric model and assumed values for the large to compensate for reductions in processor supply elasticity as indicated in Table 3 . Zidack, price. Overall, supply response is seen as attenuKinnucan and Hatch estimate a catfish supply elas-ating the CBA effect on farm price and accentuatticity of 0.15; Branch and Tilley estimate a "har-ing the CBA effect on wholesale price. vest response" elasticity of 0.58. Both estimates One way to gauge the relative CBA impacts on are used in the simulations to gauge the sensitivity producers and processors is to measure the associof results to supply response. In addition, the proportion of total pond production controlled by the CBA is set alternatively to 0.50 and 0.80 to assess Table 4 ated changes in producer surplus (quasi-rent) at rangements in agriculture. In the case of the Cateach market level. For this purpose, I set kB equal fish Bargaining Association, producers elected to to 0.50 and simulated the model for alternative elevate price above prevailing market prices, but values of the supply and demand elasticities as failed to take corresponding action to limit supply. indicated in Table 5 . Looking first at the effects for The inevitable increases in supply that are stimu-N = 0.32, results indicate that if supply is rela-lated by effective price floors undermine the ability tively inelastic (E = 0.15), the increase in pro-of agricultural bargaining associations to sustain ducer surplus at the farm level exceeds the reduc-meaningful price enhancement for any length of tion in producer surplus at the wholesale level, time. Fortunately for the CBA and its producer resulting in a slight net gain for the industry as a members, however, catfish supply is sufficiently whole. However, if supply is relatively elastic (E price inelastic to render collective action effective, = 0.58), processing-sector losses exceed farm at least for the modest increases in market price gains by nearly 6:1. induced by the cartel thus far. If the demand elasticity is increased from 0.32
The econometric estimates suggest that about to unity, the elasticity estimated in earlier work, 80% of the increase in the announced CBA-floor the adverse effects of a relatively elastic supply price appears as an increase in the farm price when response are attenuated but processor losses still supply is fixed. Given that CBA participation outweigh producer gains (Table 5) . If the supply never represented more than 80% of total producelasticity is reduced to E = 0.15 and demand is tion and probably averaged closer to 55% over the unitary elastic, processor losses are relatively mod-1989-93 period (Allen) , this suggests that CBA est compared to producer gains. The incidence of price-enhancement extended beyond cartel membargaining association impacts, therefore, is sen-bership. This does not necessarily mean, however, sitive to supply and demand elasticities. In this that non-participants are free riders in the ordinary application, net gains to the industry as a whole sense of the term. As revealed by the comparative-(producers and processors) are largest when supply static model, free-riding serves the important ecois relatively inelastic and demand is relatively elas-nomic function of limiting the supply increases astic. Given my "best guess" supply and demand sociated with the cartel price. Thus, enlarging carelasticities (E = 0.15 and N = 0.32), it appears tel participation does not necessarily enhance a that CBA-induced gains to producers have been cartel's effectiveness when supply is uncontrolled. modest ($9.23 million in 1993) and sufficient to Apart from any potential losses to consumers, offset losses to processors. the clear losers in this producer-cartel pricing scheme are processors. According to my analysis, processors always lose from successful producer Concluding Comments bargaining, unless supply is unresponsive to price. For the parameter values that appear to govern the e m r t e f ts p r is tht s r catfish industry in recent years, the simulation reThe major theme of this paper is that supply reindicate that the CA at t i a r sponse is critical to the success of cartel-like arts init t the CBA at bt is abreakeven proposition for the industry as a whole, and may have resulted in significant transfers from Table 5 . Incidence of CBA on Producer processors to producers.' Thus, to the extent that Surplus at Farm and Wholesale for producers have ownership interest in the processAlternative Values of the Demand Elasticity ing sector through cooperatives or vertical integra-(N) and Supply Elasticity (E) tion, the net gain to producers is ambiguous. Still, my results overall suggest that price bargaining N = 0.32 N = 1.00 associations can be effective at enhancing farm inVariable E = 0.15 E = 0.58 E = 0.15 E = 0.58 come-provided supply is sufficiently price inelastic to limit the increases in output that inevitably ------------million dollars ---------flow from price-enhancement endeavors in a com- ad PS represents the change in producer surplus. It is calculated using the basic formula d PS = dln P P* Q* (1 + 0.5 dln Q) where P* and Q* are the initial equilibrium values of price and This conjecture is consistent with the fact that Delta Pride, a major quantity reported in Table 3 . The sign-up parameter kB is set to processor and a producer-owned cooperative, required "paybacks" from 0.50 in these simulations. Note: the annual cost of running the farmers to cover operating losses sustained following the signing of CBA was about $150,000 (Allen) .
contracts in 1989-91.
